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The determinants of local organizational density and the impacts of local and 
external organizations on collective and private natural resource management decisions 
are investigated based on a survey of 48 villages in central Honduras.  Factors positively 
associated with local organizational development include the presence of external 
organizations, population level, moderate population growth, lower population density, 
the presence of immigrants, distance from the urban market, literacy and coffee 
production.  Local organizations are found to contribute to collective action to conserve 
resources, while government organizations appear to displace it, though not in all cases.  
The findings suggest that external organizations can play a catalytic role in fostering 
development of local organizations and emphasize the importance of improved 
understanding of the roles of local organizations, in order to enhance complementarity 
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 ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM CENTRAL HONDURAS 
 




In recent years a consensus has begun to emerge regarding the importance of local 
institutional and organizational development in developing countries as a necessary 
complement to economic, social and political development.  Numerous observers have 
hailed the increased role for local organizations and other elements of civil society in the 
wake of structural adjustment policies and declining government budgets in many 
developing countries (Farrington and Bebbington 1993; de Janvry and Sadoulet 1993; 
Uphoff 1993; Nugent 1993). 
Local (or "grassroots”) organizations, defined in this paper as non-governmental 
organizations (excluding private firms operating for profit) governed and operating at the 
village level or below (Uphoff 1993), have been claimed to offer numerous advantages 
favoring rural development (Farrington and Bebbington 1993).
1  These include increasing 
economic efficiency where private markets fail; increasing the effectiveness of 
government and non-government programs by involving local people in the design and 
implementation of such programs; reducing poverty in rural areas by responding to the 
needs of the rural poor; empowering rural people by increasing their role in decision 
processes that affect their lives; and improving management of natural resources by 
                                                 
1 Uphoff (1986) distinguishes organizations, defined as "structures of recognized 
and accepted roles", from institutions, defined as "complexes of norms and behaviors that 
persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes".  There are many examples of 
organizations that are not institutions (for example, a particular law firm), institutions that 
are not organizations ("the law"), and organizations that are institutions (the Supreme 





helping to foster collective action to manage externalities or common property resources 
(Baland and Platteau 1996; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick 1995; Uphoff 1986).  
Although substantial work has investigated some of these claims, drawing comparative 
conclusions about these issues from much of the literature is difficult because of the 
idiosyncratic nature of many of the case studies that are reported, lack of a representative 
sampling frame, measurement of different variables in different studies, and lack of use 
of rigorous statistical procedures to test hypotheses about the impacts of key variables 
(Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick 1995).
2 
The present study represents a modest effort to address some of these 
shortcomings through a study of the development of local organizations and their impacts 
on natural resource management (NRM) in a representative sample of villages in central 
Honduras.  The issues of local organizational development and natural resource 
management are critical in Honduras.  Local organizational development is relatively 
limited in most of rural Honduras, and problems of resource degradationCincluding 
deforestation, watershed degradation, soil erosion, soil fertility decline, water scarcity and 
water contaminationCare increasingly critical as population continues to grow rapidly in 
the fragile hillsides of the country (Pender and Durón 1996).  However, new 
opportunities have arisen as a result of declining central government presence in rural 
areas, increased authority of local governments, and greater presence of non-  
                                                 
2 The seminal work of Esman and Uphoff (1984) is an exception to this 
generalization, although the method of selection of their case studies limits the ability to 





governmental organizations (NGOs) since the early 1990s (Durón and Bergeron 1995).  
Now is thus an opportune time to study organizational development in Honduras. 
In this study, we do not focus on organizational function or performance, but 
rather on the determinants and impacts of local organizational presence.  We focus on 
voluntary local organizations, which are the dominant form of local organization in the 
region.  In contrast to some recent literature, we emphasize that local organizational 
development may affect private NRM decisions as well as affecting collective action to 
manage resources. 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual model for this study draws upon the theory of induced 
institutional innovation (Hayami and Ruttan 1985; North 1990).  This theory posits that 
institutional innovation is induced by changes in relative factor prices or other changes in 
the net benefits of innovation, and that such innovation influences farmer decisions and 
can thus have feedback effects on the disequilibria that stimulated the change.  In our 
case, we hypothesize that organizational innovation responds to changes in the factors 
influencing the costs and benefits of organizational activity.  Although organizations and 
institutions are not identical, we posit that a similar process of induced change applies to 
organizational development as to institutional change.
3  As in the case of institutional 
change, the process of induced organizational development is not likely to be automatic, 
occurring whenever the aggregate benefits of change exceed the costs, because of the  
                                                 
3 Many of the changes discussed by North and Hayami and Ruttan involve 





high degree of uncertainty about the benefits and costs, the need for collective action to 
attain the benefits, and the presence of high fixed costs and other indivisibilities that may 
cause the process to be path-dependent (North). 
In our conceptual framework, changes in factor endowments, market access, 
economic opportunities, access to technology, interventions by external programs and 
organizations, local natural resource and socioeconomic conditions and other factors 
affecting the benefits and costs of organizational activity are hypothesized to induce local 
organizational change  (Figure 1).  Development of local organizations can influence 
natural resource management (NRM) by affecting collective or private actions.  
Collective action affecting NRM may include community regulation to address 
externalities, or collective investments to improve common lands, protect the watershed, 
or otherwise achieve collective benefits.  Private actions affecting NRM may include 
adoption and/or adaptation of new agricultural technologies; intensification of use of 
factors of production; investments in land or other resource improvements on private 
land; adoption of soil and water conservation and organic fertility management practices.
4 
Both collective and private action affecting NRM may be influenced by a large number 
of factors other than organizational development; including many of the factors that 
influence organizational development itself.  These factors include access to 
infrastructure, information, local knowledge, risk, factors of production (land, labor, 
capital), wealth, and the physical/technical factors that determine local comparative 
advantage (rainfall, soil types, etc.) (McCullough et al. 1998).  Changes in NRM as 
                                                 
4 Some of these investments may also occur on common or private lands through 







determined by collective and private actions lead to changes in outcomes within the 
village, including impacts on agricultural production, incomes, and resource conditions.  
These changes in outcomes may influence the costs and benefits of organizational 
activity, as well as affecting the returns to collective and private action directly, and thus 
have feedback effects on the process of organizational development and NRM. 
 





3. RESEARCH METHOD 
We investigated the determinants of local organizational development and the 
impacts of organizational development on collective and private action affecting NRM 
using data collected from a survey of 48 villages in the central hillsides region of 
Honduras.  The central region was defined to include all municipios (analogous to 
counties) of the department of Francisco Morazan except two lowland valley 
communities, and five adjacent hilly municipios in the department of El Paraiso. 
The central region is relatively homogeneous in terms of topography and climate, 
while it includes substantial variation in population density, access to markets, and 
agricultural practices.
5  Over 90% of the region is on hillsides and the climate is generally 
sub-humid tropical, with annual rainfall ranging from 1000 to 2000 mm.  Rural 
population density averaged 25 persons/km.
2 in 1988, though it ranged from as low as 9 
to as high as 87 in some municipalities.  Many villages in the region lack access to roads, 
requiring up to a half-day by foot or pack animal to reach from the nearest road.  
Although soils are generally of poor quality and thin and natural pastures are limited, 
crop and livestock production are the main sources of rural livelihood. 
There are serious resource degradation and poverty problems in the region.  
About half of the region is still covered by pine forest, though nearly one-fifth of the area 
has been deforested since the 1960s.  Soil erosion is a serious problem, with estimated 
erosion rates in the region ranging from 22 to 46 tons per hectare per year, causing 
economic losses of as much as 700 Lempiras ($60) per hectare per year (World Bank, 
                                                 





1991).  Other major resource and environmental concerns include declining forest 
quality, soil fertility depletion, watershed degradation, water pollution caused by 
agrochemicals and other factors, and air pollution caused by forest fires and agricultural 
burning.  Poverty is severe; more than 40% of children were malnourished and more than 
half of households lack access to potable water or health services in 1991.
6 
STUDY SAMPLE 
The villages surveyed were selected by a stratified random sample of 48 of the 325 
rural aldeas (villages) in this region (excluding Tegucigalpa, the urban center of the 
region and the capital of Honduras).  The stratification was based on 1974 population 
density of the municipio (municipality) in which each aldea was located (more or less 
than 30 persons per km.
2) and the distance of the municipio county seat to Tegucigalpa 
(more or less than 60 km.).  Twelve aldeas were selected from each stratum, and all of 
the aldeas selected participated in the study.
7  We over-sampled high population density 
municipios to obtain sufficient variation in population density in the sample. 
SOURCES OF DATA 
The sources of information used for the study included a community-level 
questionnaire administered with groups of typically 15 to 20 respondents, participatory 
resource mapping, data from the 1974 and 1988 population census, and maps of  
                                                 
6 Based on data from the Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social for the municipios 
in the central region, excluding Distrito Central, which is dominated by Tegucigalpa.  
7 Of the 31 municipios in the central region, 12 (representing 153 aldeas) were 
classified as low population density/close to Tegucigalpa, 11 (101 aldeas) were classified 






topography, climate, soils and other geographical features of Honduras.  The 
questionnaire explored community members' perceptions about the current state and 
changes since 1975 in agriculture and NRM (including private and collective action), the 
factors causing or conditioning these changes (including organizational presence), and 
some of the consequences of these changes for agricultural production, human welfare 
and natural resource conditions.
8  The questionnaire included a census of all of the 
organizations that had worked in the aldea since 1975 and descriptions of the activities of 
those that were involved in NRM.  Complete information on organizations was obtained 
for only 40 of the communities, so these are used as the basis for the analysis in this 
paper.
9  The participatory mapping identified aldea boundaries (needed to compute 
village area and population density).  The census data provided information on 
population and some indicators of access to social services, literacy and poverty. 
In the respondent groups, we sought to obtain representation of people of different 
ages, gender, and from different neighborhoods in each village.  Unfortunately, however, 
women were under-represented in the group of respondents in most communities, 
probably for cultural reasons.  This may have reduced the availability and quality of 
information related to women's organizations (such as housewives' clubs) and activities in 
which women are more commonly involved.  However, according to the respondents  
                                                 
8 The questionnaire and details on the implementation of the survey are provided 
in Pender and Scherr (1997).  
9 Information on the extent of participation in local organizations was collected 
but was not sufficiently complete to be used in the analysis. Nearly all of the 
organizations mentioned in the organization census were organizations that still exist in 
the communities.  It is possible that there was under-reporting of organizations that have 





(including the women respondents), women are generally less involved than men in most 
of the agricultural and resource management activities discussed in this paper, so the bias in 
the results reported here related to under-representation of women may not have been large. 
ANALYSIS 
We investigated the determinants of local organizational presence and the impacts 
of organizational presence using econometric analysis, supported by qualitative 
information from the survey.  The variables included in these regressions and the 
hypotheses about the impacts of explanatory variables are discussed in a later section.  In 
all regressions, the coefficients and standard errors were corrected for sampling weights, 
stratification, and the total number of communities in the central region (StataCorp 1997). 
 The results are thus representative of the region as a whole.  Standard errors were 
estimated using the Huber-White estimator, and are thus robust to general forms of 
heteroskedasticity (White 1980). 
The Apathways of development@ found in the region, were included as explanatory 
factors in the analysis (along with other factors).
10  A development pathway is defined as 
a common pattern of change in livelihoods and resource management, and thus represents 
a particular set of economic opportunities and constraints (Pender, Scherr, and Duron 
1999).  Using data on occupations and changes in occupations and land use since the 
mid-1970s, six pathways of development were identified.  Basic grain (maize, beans and 
sorghum) production is the most or second most important occupation in all but one of 
                                                 
10  The explanatory factors and hypotheses concerning their impacts are discussed 
later in the paper.  Here, we introduce the concept of development pathways, since this is 





the sample communities.  Other factors were therefore more determinate in distinguishing 
the pathways.  The pathways include villages where 1) basic grain production is the 
dominant economic activity and has been expanding during the past 20 years ("basic 
grains expansion pathway"), 2) basic grains production is the dominant economic activity 
though production has been stagnant or declining ("basic grains stagnation pathway"), 3) 
horticultural (mainly vegetable) production has increased and has become the first or 
second most important activity ("horticultural expansion pathway"), 4) coffee production 
has increased and is the first or second most important activity ("coffee expansion 
pathway"), 5) forestry activities are the first or second most important activity ("forestry 
specialization pathway"), and 6) non-farm employment has increased and become the 
first or second most important source of income ("non-farm employment pathway").
11 
 
4. LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NRM IN CENTRAL HONDURAS 
ORGANIZATIONAL PRESENCE  
Rural organization in the central region has historically been poorly developed.  
Factors that may have contributed to this include poverty, low population density, poor 
communications infrastructure, political and economic marginality, a tradition of 
dependence on government organizations, and the relative lack of ethnic differentiation in 
                                                 
11 In almost all of the basic grains expansion and stagnation communities, 
livestock production is the second most important activity.  All of these pathways are 






12  In the 1970s, most organizations were the local offices of national 
ministries or programs.  Local people organized themselves mainly for marketing coffee, 
pine resin and processed forest products. 
Externally-governed organizations, defined as organizations governed at a level 
above the aldea (village), continue to dominate the landscape. Many national government 
organizations are directly involved in technical assistance related to agriculture and 
NRM, and water and forest management.  Other agencies have indirect effects on NRM 
through infrastructure, social investment, education, and nutrition and health programs.  
External NGOs proliferated in the region during the 1980s and early 1990s, with the 
withdrawal of government social and technical assistance programs, increased 
availability of international funding, new attention to local environmental concerns, and 
new philosophies of decentralization and local action for public services, including NRM 
(Miranda 1997).  Over 20 externally-directed NGOs were operating there in 1997. 
The density of locally-governed community organizations averages about seven 
organizations per community (similar to the average number of externally-governed 
organizations) (Table 1).  Of these, nearly 40% are involved to some extent in 
agricultural or natural resource management activities, although not usually as their 
primary or original mandate. All are voluntary organizations.   
 
                                                 
12 The ethnic composition of the central region is predominantly ladino (mixed 
indigenous/European).  Some sociologists hypothesize that rural organizations are more 
likely to form where there are readily identifiable ethnic or social groups, such as 





Table 1 Organizational presence in Central Honduras 
Mean number of organizations per village (Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
a 
Type of Organization  Total Number per Village  Number involved in NRM 
Government organization  4.2  2.7 
  (3.1)  (1.8) 
External NGO  2.3  1.8 
  (2.0)  (1.7) 
Local NGO  7.1  2.6 
  (2.8)  (2.3) 
a Means and standard errors corrected for sampling weights, stratification, and finite population. 
 
The "patronato" has official status as the primary local decision making body at 
the village level, and exists in almost all villages.  Patronatos are involved in NRM 
activities such as repair and construction of drinking water systems, and forest protection, 
management or establishment in public areas or near water sources. Water committees 
are relatively common (found in over 60% of villages), and are responsible for 
maintaining and protecting drinking water systems.  Parent associations are common (in 
over three-fourths of villages), and are mainly involved in school improvements, 
sometimes including tree planting.  Church groups are very common, but they are not 
often involved in NRM activities, though some have been involved in reforestation, 
guarding forests, and education about safe use of water.  Various types of cooperatives 
and work groups are found in a few communities, mainly in the non-farm and coffee 
pathways.  A few student and school groups undertake reforestation.  A few communities 
have local chapters of indigenous councils or other civic and social groups. 
ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN NRM 
Organizations in the central region commonly play three roles in natural resource 





• Service or support to local farmers and residents in managing privately held 
natural resources (for example, to improve agricultural production and 
conservation);  
• Collective investment in common property resources (e.g., community forest 
management, reforestation, building and repairing water systems, run-off 
control); and 
• Regulation of local natural resource use and management by individuals and 
groups (e.g., watershed and forest protection, water distribution, forest 
management). 
Organizational activities related to common property resources have only recently 
begun to shift from protection (reducing degradation) to improvement (rehabilitating 
degraded land or enhancing the quality of existing resources), while organizational 
activities related to private farm resources is shifting slowly from production to 
conservation.  The greatest concern sparking voluntary collective action has been 
protection of water resources for local consumption. Local people were also willing to 
organize to protect forest resources where these are important economically or to protect 
local watersheds.  Similar efforts were uncommon for soil conservation. Local people 
acted mainly through existing organizations, although new temporary coalitions arose in 
a few cases to address perceived emergencies. 
Support for Local Farmers in NRM 
Externally-managed organizations have played a pivotal role in the introduction 
and dissemination of new agricultural, conservation, livestock and forestry technologies 
in the central region, both through direct extension and indirectly through diffusion and 
local information systems.  Municipalities were active in no-burning campaigns.  Many 





bank credit or forest micro-enterprise supportCthrough specially organized farmer 
groups, but these typically disbanded when services were discontinued.  Some farmer 
cooperatives and work groups are supported by outside agencies or supra-local farmer 
organizations, which provide access to production technology, agricultural inputs, credit, 
or marketing services for particular commercial products (coffee, resin, sugar, wood 
products). Most spontaneous diffusion of new NRM practices has occurred through 
individual, rather than collective, action.  
Collective Investment 
Collective investment in natural resources is only incipient in the Central region. 
Most activities are organized by patronatos, local water committees, the municipality, or 
special projects partially financed externally; the major local input is labor.  Group action 
was reported mainly for road maintenance or for building and maintaining potable water 
systems, which occurs in nearly all communities (Table 2).  This reflects the local priority 
for activities with high near-term benefits.  There has been little collective investment in 
irrigation systems; rather, inexpensive ditch and hose irrigation has been established by 







Table 2 Collective investments by communities in Central Honduras 
 
Type of Investment  Percentage of Communities 
Investing
a 
   
Road maintenance 
91.7 
   
Constructing/maintaining potable water system  87.5 
   
Controlling runoff  20.8 
   
Investments on common land (mainly tree 
planting) 
10.6 
   
Collective investments on private land  4.2 
a Percentages corrected for sampling weights and stratification. 
 
About one-fifth of the region's communities have organized to control water 
drainage or runoff, by planting trees near water sources or building stone walls.  Field 
visits suggested that these were constructed principally to protect other infrastructure 
investments, such as roads or water tanks, or to avoid mass movement of soil.  All tree 
planting was organized by local schools, while stone walls were constructed by 
community members after damage had occurred (Durón 1998).  External organizations 
were involved in only a few of these cases (promoting tree planting near water sources).   
Only a tenth of all communities worked collectively on common land 
improvements, mainly tree-planting.
13  In one case, an external organization had 
catalyzed the effort by offering food for work to plant trees.  All other cases were  
                                                 
13 ACommon land@ refers to national or municipal land that has not been allocated 





organized by members of the community through the school or patronato.  Collective 
investments on private land (e.g., drainage construction or maintenance) are even more 
rare. 
Local Regulation of Natural Resources 
Until recently, rural people have had limited legal control over natural resources 
other than private cropland.  The national Forestry Law of 1974 gave control over forest 
resources on both public and private lands exclusively to the state.  Much of the land was 
national or municipal land subject to restrictions on their use and sale, although most 
farmers had relatively secure tenure.  In the 1990s, the legal and institutional context for 
local organization for NRM changed considerably.  The Law of Modernization and 
Development of Agriculture (LMDSA) of 1992 led to the withdrawal of many national 
government services and market controls.  Agrarian reform land was given full legal 
status as privately titled land.  The Forest Law of 1993 returned many of the rights of 
commercial use and access to timber and forests to private landowners, local 
communities and municipalities,although usually subject to some rules for resource 
protection.  Although the area of national or municipal lands had declined in many 
communities, they were still present in two thirds of our survey communities in 1996; 
Jurisdictional conflicts are common on such lands. 
Local knowledge and interpretation of the new rules varies greatly.  The resulting 
set of norms actually imposed locally to address externalities in NRM thus varied, 
sometimes reflecting local priorities as much as actual legislation.  In 1996, fewer than 





outsiders.  A quarter prohibited agricultural cultivation on those public lands; few had 
grazing restrictions.  The priority environmental concerns reflected in regulations were 
water supply and quality.  A third of communities with public lands reported having local 
restrictions on the use of water from those lands. Water restrictions included granting 
priority for human consumption and prohibitions on contamination.  Many forest 
regulations also serve to protect water resources.  While fewer than half of the 
communities with public land reported restricting fuelwood collection, most restricted 
pole and timber extraction (requiring cutting permits, or prohibiting clearing around 
water sources).  A few communities regulate or prohibit pine resin collection. 
Regulations are occasionally enforced directly by the national forest, water or 
other agencies, but in most cases enforcement is the responsibility of the municipality (or 
its locally-based representative) or the local patronato.
14  In cases involving problems 
caused by community members, there are usually attempts to first deal with externality 
problems informally.  If there is no response, then officials or a community group 
approach the person; the next step is to bring the matter to the attention of the municipal 
representative.  Continued intransigence would lead the community to raise their 
concerns to higher municipal authorities or a national public agency, and/or begin legal 
proceedings.  For externalities caused by people from outside the aldea, the initial 
approach by community members is followed by recourse to the municipality and the 
public agencies.  Formal complaints are uncommon.  It is unclear whether this is due to 
few violations, the effectiveness of informal mechanisms, reluctance to impose sanctions, 
                                                 





questions as to the legitimacy or effectiveness of the formal mechanisms, or other 
reasons. 
One would expect to find more dependence on non-local authorities for regulatory 
enforcement in conditions where local people are affected by few locally important 
externalities, where external authorities are actively present, or where the problems are 
caused by outside groups (or powerful individuals) over whom local authorities have no 
effective jurisdiction.  By contrast, one would expect to find more dependence on local 
authorities where management practices are perceived to generate significant local 
externalities. 
These expectations appear consistent with observed differences in enforcement of 
rules among the different development pathways. In the basic grains expansion and non-
farm employment pathways, all enforcement was reported to be by outside agencies. In 
the former, this can be explained by the relatively low level of externalities of importance 
to local people, as a result of relatively low population density and resource pressures. In 
the latter, it may be explained by the greater presence of national agencies and large 
externalities caused by outsiders.  In the horticultural pathway, most problems are 
resolved by the municipality, or otherwise by outside agencies; this may reflect the low 
level of local organizational development in this pathway. In the coffee and forestry 
pathways, the main actors are local organizations (e.g., forestry coops) and outside 
agencies.  In the relatively densely populated basic grains stagnation pathway, with large 
local externalities, local and municipal authorities were the principal enforcers of natural 





5. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
DETERMINANTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DENSITY 
Variables and hypotheses 
The dependent variables in the analysis of local organizational development was 
the number of local organizations existing in the community at the time of the survey, 
and the number involved in NRM activities.  These are obviously only very rough 
measures of organizational development and abstract from many important issues such as 
organizational performance, sustainability, intensity of activity, etc.  We were not able to 
obtain satisfactory measures of such aspects of organizational development given the 
extensive nature of the survey and the limited time we were able to spend in each village 
(half a day).  More intensive research is needed to study these issues.  
Least squares regression was used to investigate the determinants of 
organizational presence.  The explanatory variables included in the regressions were the 
number of external organizations that have worked in the village, the population of the 
village in 1974, population density in 1974, population growth rate (between 1974 and 
1988) and growth rate squared, distance of the village from Tegucigalpa, distance to the 
nearest road, adult literacy rate in 1974, the percentage of the 1974 population born 
within the municipio, and dummy variables representing the different pathways of 
development identified by the survey.
15 
                                                 
15 Summary statistics for all variables used in the regression analyses are reported 





Because they may be endogenous to the process of organizational development, 
predicted values of the population growth rate, the population growth rate squared, and 
development pathway variables were used in the regressions.
16,17  The presence of 
external organizations also may be endogenous, since it could have been influenced by 
local organizational development.  There is also the potential for omitted variable bias to 
cause a spurious correlation, if unobserved factors were responsible for both local and 
external organizational presence.  We were not able to use an instrumental variables 
approach to correct for these problems, since any variable that influences development of 
external organizations may also directly affect local organizational development.  Thus, 
the number of local and external organizations may be correlated not because external 
organizations stimulate local organizational development, but because local organizations 
attract external organizations, or because both local and external organizational 
development are stimulated by other, unobserved factors.  
                                                 
16 The variables used to predict the population growth rate and growth rate 
squared include all of the other explanatory variables, plus dummy variables for whether 
the community had access to a road in 1975, whether road access had been obtained since 
1975, and the proportions of households having access to water, sanitation, electricity or 
radio in 1974.  The development pathway dummy variables were replaced by predicted 
probabilities from a multinomial logit regression of pathway determinants (this regression 
is reported in Pender et al. 1999).  The explanatory variables for the pathways include 
mid-point altitude of the village, average number of rainfall days, 1974 population 
density, distance to Tegucigalpa, distance to the nearest road, and whether a technical 
assistance program had worked in the village.  
17 For technical reasons, the standard errors could not be corrected for the fact that 
predicted values were used in the regressions in this study.  We are not aware of 
analytical formulas to correct the standard errors for the complex two-stage regressions 
used (e.g., including predicted probabilities from a multinomial logit model for an 
ordered probit model in a second stage regression).  Given the small number of 
observations per stratum, bootstrapping does not appear justifiable.  We examined the 
robustness of our findings to use of actual vs. predicted values and to exclusion of the 





The explanatory variables may affect the benefits or costs of organizational 
development.  A higher population level is expected to positively affect the demand for 
organizations, but may also increase the cost of organizing.  Controlling for population 
level, population density represents the scarcity of resources and geographic proximity of 
village households, both factors that may increase organizational density.  Greater 
scarcity of resources may lead to greater demand for organizations to help allocate and 
conserve resources (such as water user associations) (Scherr and Hazell 1994); while 
closer proximity of households is expected to reduce the transactions costs of 
organizational development (Mumtaz 1995).  On the other hand, resource scarcity may 
increase potential conflict and thus undermine the ability to establish and maintain 
effective organizations to regulate use of natural resources.
18 
We also include the population growth rate and the square of the population 
growth rate to reflect the impact of immigration or emigration.
19  Where the population 
growth rate is unusually low this is likely due to emigration, while an unusually high 
growth rate is likely due to immigration.  In both cases, lower stability of the community 
population may reduce the ability to achieve collective action in organizational 
development (Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick 1995; Baland and Platteau 1996; Bardhan 
                                                 
18 It may be that resource scarcity induces organizational or institutional 
development only after a threshold level of resource damage has been realized (Scherr 
and Hazell 1994; Otsuka and Place forthcoming).  One way to test for this is to include 
higher order polynomial terms (e.g., population density squared).  Unfortunately, the 
correlation of population density squared with population density in our sample is very 
high (0.94), limiting our ability to identify such nonlinear effects.  Regressions including 
both population density squared and population density as explanatory variables resulted 
in both variables being statistically insignificant. 






1993; Ostrom 1990).  Thus we expect an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
population growth and organizational development, with a positive effect of growth rate 
and negative effect of growth rate squared. 
The percentage of the village born within the municipio reflects the absence of 
immigrants, and may be related to the social proximity of village members, presence of 
relations of trust and potential for social sanctions, all of which may determine the ability 
to achieve collective action in forming and maintaining organizations (Ibid.).  On the 
other hand, the presence of immigrants may increase the demand for organizations to 
manage potential conflicts or increase awareness of opportunities for organizational 
development.  Thus this variable may have mixed effects. 
As with migration, market integration may undermine the ability to attain 
collective action, since community members may have more "exit" options where 
markets are more integrated (Ibid.).  On the other hand, greater access to markets may 
increase the demand for some kinds of organizational development related to economic 
opportunities, unless entry of private firms or state intervention displace the need for such 
development (Bebbington et al. 1996; Uphoff 1986).  Market access may also influence 
organizational development by affecting village members' access to information and 
knowledge of alternative organizational forms, as well as by affecting economic 
opportunities.  Thus the expected impacts of measures of market access, including 
distance to Tegucigalpa and distance to a road, are ambiguous. 
Education and literacy may affect organizational development.  Education may 
increase awareness of opportunities for organizational development and the ability of 





1984).  More educated individuals may have a longer-term perspective due to greater 
access to credit or greater ability to save (Pender 1996).  Where a high proportion of a 
community is literate (compared to a moderate percentage as in the less literate 
communities in the sample), this may indicate less heterogeneity in terms of wealth or 
social status, which may favor collective action as argued by many authors (Ostrom 
1990; Tang 1992; Bardhan 1993); though the negative impact of wealth heterogeneity is 
disputed by Baland and Platteau (1996).  On the other hand, education may increase the 
awareness of exit options of community members and thus tend to undermine collective 
action.  More educated people may have higher opportunity costs of their time, so they 
may be less prone to participate in collective action.  Thus the net impact of education is 
theoretically ambiguous. 
The presence of external organizations in the village can also have mixed effects. 
 On one hand, such organizations may be catalysts for local organizational development 
and help to strengthen the capacity of local organizations (Farrington and Bebbington 
1993; Esman and Uphoff 1984; Ostrom 1990; Thomas-Slayter 1992).  On the other hand, 
such external influences may compete with or undermine local organizations, by reducing 
the need for local collective action (Thomas-Slayter 1992; Thomas-Slayter 1994).  
The different pathways of development may have different implications for 
organizational development.  We expect greater demand for economic organizations such 
as producer associations, credit groups and cooperatives where cash crop production is 
occurring, as in the horticultural and coffee expansion pathways, than in the basic grains 
pathways (Uphoff 1986).  On the other hand, the higher incomes associated with such 





have a higher opportunity cost of their time, increased exit options from their 
communities, or greater social heterogeneity.  Thus the net impact of development 
pathways on organizational development, as with most other factors, cannot be 
determined a priori, but is an important empirical issue. 
Cultural, ethnic or religious heterogeneity, distribution of assets or income are 
also factors that could affect the costs and perceived benefits of organizing.  Lack of 
variation in ethnic and religious makeup of the study communities prevented inclusion of 
these variables in the analysis, however.  We were not able to obtain information on asset 
or income distribution so could not include this in the analysis.
20 
Results 
The regression results for organizational density are reported in Table 3.  Local 
organizational density is positively associated (at the 10% level) with the presence of 
external organizations, population level, distance from the urban market and adult 
literacy; and negatively associated with rapid population growth, the percent of the 
community born in the municipio, and the basic grains expansion and forestry pathways.  
The number of local organizations involved in NRM activities is positively associated 
with the number of external organizations involved in NRM activities, population level, 
adult literacy and the coffee expansion and non-farm employment pathways; and 
negatively associated with population density and the forestry pathway. 
                                                 
20 In our study design, we intended to use information on land distribution from 





The robustness of these findings was explored in regressions using actual rather 
than predicted population growth rate and pathway dummies, and excluding the 
pathways.
21  Almost all of the coefficients significant at the 5% level in Table 3 have the 
same sign and are significant at the 5% level in these other regressions.
22  In addition, we 
find support for the hypothesized inverted U-shaped relationship between population 
growth and organizational development in these additional regressions, with a significant 
positive coefficient of population growth rate and a significant negative coefficient of 
growth rate squared.  Based on the estimated coefficients, the maximum predicted 
number of local organizations occurs at a population growth rate of 4.0% per year in the 
first regression and 3.3% per year in the second regression.  These population growth 
rates are well within the range of population growth rates in the sample (see Appendix), 
indicating that the turning point of the inverted-U relationship occurs within the sample. 
These results generally support the theory of induced organizational development, 
particularly as regards the positive impact of population level, which we expected to be 
associated with the demand for organizations.  Interestingly, however, land scarcity (as 
measured by population density) does not appear to induce organizational development, 
and in fact is negatively associated with organizational involvement in NRM.  This 
suggests that the greater potential for conflict over resources caused by resource scarcity 
may undermine organizational development.  The results also suggest that interventions  
                                                 
21 Regression results available from the authors. 
22 The exceptions are the coefficient of basic grains expansion in the first 
regression, which is negative and significant at the 10% level when actual values are 
used; and the coefficient of the forestry pathway in both regressions, which is 





by external programs and organizations have promoted local organizational development 
in central Honduras, though this is subject to the possibilities of reverse causality or 
omitted variable bias mentioned above.  We know from qualitative evidence that in some 
cases external agencies have promoted local organizational development (Durón 1998); 
for example, efforts by an externally funded forestry project (MAFOR) to promote forest 
management cooperatives.  
The greater presence of local organizations in communities further from 
Tegucigalpa supports the argument that greater market access may undermine local 
organization by increasing community members' alternatives to participation in such 
organizations.  There may also be greater intensity of government involvement in 
communities closer to the capital city (even controlling for the number of external 
organizations involved), which would tend to substitute for local organization.  We did 
not find the same impact of proximity to Tegucigalpa for the presence of local 
organizations involved in natural resource management, perhaps because the types of 
services provided by the government do not substitute well for the natural resource 
management functions of these local organizations. 
The positive association between literacy and local organizational presence 
supports the hypothesis that more educated people may be more aware or more able to 
take advantage of opportunities for organizational development.  More educated people 
may also be more receptive to encouragement from external organizations to organize.  
The negative association between the percentage of village members born in the 
municipio and local organizational density is interesting.  This suggests that immigration 





more aware of opportunities for local organizational development.  However, there 
appears to be a diminishing impact of immigration on organizational development 
(shown by the negative coefficient of the square of the population growth rate).   
We found some impact of the pathways of development on organizational 
development, though some of the effects were not robust to the specification (see 
footnote 21).  The most robust finding with regard to the pathways is that the presence of 
local organizations involved in NRM is greater in the coffee than basic grains pathways.  
The greater presence of organizations involved in NRM in coffee communities may be 
due to several factors, including the effort by external organizations to promote local 
organizations in such areas, the greater economic value of resources in coffee 
communities, and common concerns about pollution problems caused by coffee 
processing.  The latter two possibilities are consistent with the hypothesis of induced 





Table 3 Determinants of local organizational presence 
Least Squares Regression (Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
a, b   
Variable 
 
Total Number of Local 
Organizations 
 
Number of Local Organizations 
involved in NRM
c   
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*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
a Coefficients and standard errors adjusted for sampling weights, stratification, and finite population. 
b Predicted values are used for population growth rate, population growth rate squared, and the pathway dummy variables.  
Standard errors are not adjusted for use of predicted values.  The variables used to predict the population growth rate and 
growth rate squared include all of the other explanatory variables, plus dummy variables for communities that had access to 
a road in 1975 and for communities that gained road access since 1975, and the proportions of households having access to 
water, sanitation, electricity, or radio in 1974.  Pathway probabilities are from a multinomial logit regression using as 
explanatory variables mid-point altitude, average number of rainfall days, 1974 population density, distance to Tegucigalpa, 
distance to the nearest road, and whether a technical assistance program had worked in the village. 
c For the regressions of determinants of the number of local organizations involved in natural resource management (NRM), 





DETERMINANTS OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT AFFECTING NRM 
Variables and hypotheses 
The community survey asked specifically about whether community members 
had invested collectively in efforts to control runoff, such as by planting trees and 
constructing stone walls or ditches; and whether they had invested collectively in 
improvements to common lands, such as by planting trees or shrubs in community forests 
or fencing common areas.
23  Because it may have been difficult for respondents to 
distinguish these questions, for econometric analysis we combined the responses into a 
single variable representing collective action relating to NRM (a Ayes@ to either question 
was treated as a yes, a Ano@ to both questions treated as a Ano@).  We also collected 
information on local rules for managing forests, water, and common lands (discussed 
previously in Section 4), but this information is not suitable for econometric analysis. 
A probit model was used to investigate the determinants of collective action 
relating to NRM.  Most of the explanatory variables used in the regressions for 
determinants of local organizational density were included in this regression, since 
organizational development also involves collective action and thus is affected by many 
of the same factors.  We included the number of government organizations and the 
number of external non-government organizations (NGOs) as separate variables, to 
investigate whether these different types of external organizations have different impacts. 
We also included the predicted number of local organizations from the regressions 
discussed in the preceding section as an explanatory variable.  It is arguable that all 
                                                 
23 The questionnaire did not investigate the intensity or frequency of these 





organizations, and not only those involved in NRM activities, may influence collective 
action related to NRM by affecting the level of Asocial capital@ in the village.  Thus in one 
regression we consider the total numbers of external and local organizations as 
explanatory variables, and in another we consider the number involved in NRM 
activities.  The models were not estimable when the development pathway variables were 
included; so these were excluded.
24  
We expect that local organizational density will contribute to the possibility of 
collective investment, whether or not the organizations are directly involved in natural 
resource management.  This is because the presence of local organizations may increase 
social interactions and the possibility of enforcing agreements based on the multiplex 
relationships among community members (Baland and Platteau 1996; White and Runge 
1995).  Our expectations about the effects of other variables on collective investment are 
similar to our expectations about their impact on local organizational development, since 
local organizational development itself requires collective action, as discussed above. 
Results 
Interestingly, we find that the presence of local organizations involved in NRM 
activities is positively related to collective action (statistically significant in one 
specification), while the number of government organizations is negatively associated 
with collective action (significant in both) (Table 4).  In one specification, we find that 
land scarcity is associated with less collective action, consistent with the finding of less  
                                                 
24 When too many regressors were included in the model, the model predicted the 
outcomes perfectly, and not all coefficients could be estimated.  This is a common 





Table 4 Determinants of collective action to control runoff or improve common land 
 
 Probit Regression (Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
a, b   
Variable 
 




Organizations Involved in NRM 
as Explanatory Variables
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-0.0325   














(4.70)   





*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
a Coefficients and standard errors adjusted for sampling weights, stratification, and finite 
population. 
b Predicted values are used for number of local organizations, population growth rate, and 
population growth rate squared.  Standard errors are not adjusted for use of predicted values.  
Predicted values for number of local organizations are based on the regressions in Table 3.  
Predicted values for population growth rate and growth rate squared are determined as explained 
in footnote b, Table 3. 
c In the first regression, the total number of local organizations, government organizations, and 
NGOs are the first three explanatory variables.  In the second regression, the numbers of these 





organizational activity related to NRM.  As in the case of organizational development, we 
find an inverted-U relationship between population growth and collective investment 
(though this is significant in only one specification).
25  Villages more distant from 
Tegucigalpa are less likely to engage in collective action (significant in one 
specification), while higher literacy rate is negatively associated with collective action (in 
the other specification).  
We investigated the robustness of these results, using actual rather than predicted 
levels for the number of local organizations, population growth rate and growth rate 
squared.  All of the coefficients significant at the 5% level in Table 4 are the same sign 
and significant in these other regressions, except the coefficient of literacy rate in the 
second regression (insignificant).  In addition, we find statistically significant support for 
a positive effect of population, an inverted-U relationship between population growth and 
collective action, and a negative effect of distance to roads on collective action in these 
regressions.  
Overall, these results confirm the importance of organizational presence, 
demographic factors and market access as factors influencing the potential for collective 
action.   Local organizations appear to promote collective action while external 
government organizations appear to displace it.  It may be that external government 
organizations substitute for local collective action, or they may simply choose to work in 
problem communities where local collective action is not occurring.  Even if they do  
                                                 
25 The maximum predicted probability of collective investment occurs at a 
population growth rate of 1.3% per year in the first regression and 0.8% per year in the 





displace local collective action, the net impact of external government organizations on 
collective action depends on indirect effects (via their contribution to development of 
local organizations) as well as direct effects.  Based on the magnitude of the coefficients 
in Tables 3 and 4, the direct effects appear to outweigh the indirect effects, however, so 
that external organizations tend to reduce collective action on balance. 
Qualitative information from the community survey indicates that in most cases, 
collective action to manage runoff or improve common lands occurred through local 
initiative, though in some cases, external organizations were involved (Durón 1998).  
Thus, external organizations do not always displace local action and in some cases 
promote it.  Furthermore, co-involvement of external organizations and local 
organizations in constructing and maintaining potable water systems and roads was very 
common (Ibid.).  Thus, the extent to which external organizations displaced local 
collective action appears to depend greatly on the type of collective action.  For drinking 
water systems and roads, external organizations specialized in providing capital inputs 
and technical expertise, while expecting local communities to provide complementary 
labor inputs.  The different comparative advantages of external and local organizations in 
providing these different kinds of complementary inputs explains the motive for the high 
degree of co-involvement of external and local organizations in such activities; and the 
large benefits of these activities to the recipient communities explains the near universal 
achievement of collective action in these cases.  By contrast, collective action to protect 
natural resources by planting trees, etc. likely requires less technical or capital inputs 





As with local organizational development, population growth appears to promote 
collective action, though rapid population growth may undermine it as a result of less 
stability of the population.  Population density appears to undermine collective action, 
also consistent with its impact on local organizational development. 
Unlike the case with local organizational development, proximity to the urban 
market appears to promote collective action.  This may be because of greater intensity of 
effort in such areas by external programs seeking to promote collective action in more 
accessible communities.  Since local organizations also favor collective action, the net 
impact of proximity to the urban market on collective action depends on indirect effects 
(via its impact on local organizational development) as well as direct effects.  Based on 
the magnitude of the coefficients in Tables 3 and 4, the direct effect appears to outweigh 
the indirect effect, so that communities closer to Tegucigalpa are predicted to have 
greater collective action. 
DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE ACTION AFFECTING NRM 
Variables and hypotheses 
The variables reflecting private actions affecting NRM include the extent of use 
of various cropping practices (fallow, burning, irrigation), purchased inputs (chemical 
fertilizer, insecticides, herbicides, improved seeds), annual conservation or fertility 
management practices (contour planting, green manures, minimum tillage, mulch, 
incorporation of crop residues, use of cow manure or chicken manure), and land 
improving investments (terraces, live barriers, stone walls, drainage ditches, trees).  
These variables were measured as an ordinal index from 0 to 6 (0 = no farmers use the 





all (more than 90%), 6 = all).  We used ordered probit regressions to estimate the impacts 
of the explanatory variables on farmers= likelihood of adopting different practices.
26 
The explanatory variables included in these regressions include the number of 
local organizations (predicted), number of government organizations and number of 
NGOs involved in NRM activities in the village, population density, distance of the 
village from Tegucigalpa, distance to the nearest road, literacy rate, and the (predicted) 
development pathways.  These variables reflect many of the factors hypothesized by 
McCullough et al. (1998) to affect private technology choice, including access to 
infrastructure (distance to a road), access to information (presence of external 
organizations, distance to Tegucigalpa, literacy), credit (proxied by development 
pathways and literacy rate), labor/land endowment (population density), 
physical/technical conditioning factors determining comparative advantage (determinants 
of predicted pathways of development), and collective action (presence of local organizations). 
 Household and plot level data and time-series data would be needed to adequately incorporate 
some of the other factors, such as risk, property rights, prices, and wealth. 
There are too many dependent variables reflecting private NRM decisions to 
discuss hypotheses specific to each one.  We focus here on the expected impacts of 
organizations.  Government and NGO technical assistance organizations are expected to 
have increased adoption of practices they have been promoting, such as various 
conservation practices, while reducing use of some traditional practices that they have 
discouraged, such as burning.  The presence of local producer associations may favor 
                                                 
26 Ordered probit is a simple generalization of a standard binary probit model 
allowing for multiple ordered categories, estimated by maximum likelihood.  See 





adoption of more modern commercial practices, such as adoption of irrigation and 
purchased inputs, to the extent that they help farmers obtain access to information about 
such technologies or access to inputs and credit (Uphoff 1986). 
Results 
The effects of organizations on cropping practices and use of inputs are mixed.  
Local organizations are associated with greater use of burning, chemical fertilizer, 
chicken manure and mulching, but less use of insecticides or plowing in of crop residues 
(Tables 5, 6 and 7).  Government organizations are associated with greater use of 
insecticides, plowing in of crop residues, and terracing, and less use of fallow, burning 
and mulching.  NGOs are associated with greater use of fallow, minimum till, plowing in 
of crop residues, and live barriers, and less use of chemical fertilizers and chicken 
manure. 
The robustness of these findings was investigated using regressions including 
actual rather than predicted values of the number of local organizations and the pathway 
variables, and regressions excluding the pathways.  Most of these results were found to 
be robust.
27 
It is difficult to simply characterize such complex results, but it appears that 
NGOs and government organizations have a tendency to promote more labor intensive  
practices and investments such as terracing, live barriers, and plowing in of crop residues, 
while local farmer organizations help to promote more immediately profitable and less  
                                                 
27 The non-robust exceptions were the positive association between NGOs and 
fallow, the negative association between NGOs and chemical fertilizer use, the negative 
ld association between government organizations and mulching, and the positive 





labor intensive methods such as use of chemical fertilizer and chicken manure.  The 
differential association of local and government organizations with burning practices is 
an example of this; where local organizations are more prevalent, burning is more 
common, whereas government organizations inhibit use of burning.  The fact that 
government organizations discourage burning is not surprising, given that it is 
government policy to prevent agricultural burning.  The positive association of burning 
with local organizations is somewhat surprising.  This finding probably does not mean 
that local organizations promote burning; rather, government organizations may be less 
actively involved (even if present) in areas where local organizations are well developed, 





Table 5 Determinants of cropping practices 
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  (0.855)  (0.960)  (1.010)  (0.776)  (0.970)  (0.789)  (4047) 
Horticultural expansion
c  1.782*  -5.444***  3.726***  3.027***  4.756***  -1.387*  5.891*** 
  (0.968)  (1.103)  (1.327)  (0.990)  (1.010)  (0.767)  (1.603) 
Coffee expansion
c  -1.985**  -3.550***  -1.291*  2.554***  0.913  -0.761  3.238*** 
  (0.877)  (0.800)  (0.754)  (0.624)  (0.878)  (0.682)  (1.160) 
Forestry specialization
c  6.497***  -5.996***  -1.308  2.171  -0.308  2.899*  4.934* 
  (1.891)  (1.326)  (1.730)  (1.560)  (1.840)  (1.630)  (2.555) 
Non-farm employment
c  -0.576  -1.259  0.072  -2.095***  2.171**  -1.114  5.046** 
  (0.868)  (0.935)  (0.816)  (0.770)  (0.983)  (0.899)  (1.910) 
 















*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
 
a Coefficient and standard errors corrected for sampling weights, stratification, and finite population. 
b Predicted number of organizations, based on results of regressions reported in Table 3. 





Table 6 Determinants of annual soil conservation/organic fertility management practices 



















































(0.308)   





























(0.192)   





























(0.226)   






























(0.00610)   





























(0.0223)   





























(2.64)   














































  (0.973)  (1.765)  (2.236)  (1.287)  (8.194)  (0.691)  (3.331) 
Horticultural expansion
c  -3.735***  -7.870*  -2.961  -1.388  -1.302  -2.674**  -2.937 
  (1.209)  (3.905)  (1.894)  (1.079)  (0.990)  (1.085)  (2.124) 
Coffee expansion
c  0.441  1.050  1.827  0.462  -1.476*  -0.622  0.245 
  (0.765)  (1.152)  (1.245)  (0.483)  (0.768)  (0.793)  (1.013) 
Forestry specialization
c  5.288***  -0.021  -1.138  -3.671  0.080  -0.279  -0.747 
  (1.839)  (1.898)  (2.074)  (3.405)  (1.334)  (1.270)  (2.039) 
Non-farm employment
c  -3.783***  -2.536*  -1.264  -1.657**  -1.705**  -2.179*  -1.232 
  (1.242)  (1.370)  (1.526)  (0.724)  (0.726)  (1.109)  (1.314) 
 















*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
 
a Coefficient and standard errors corrected for sampling weights, stratification, and finite population. 
b Predicted number of organizations, based on results of regressions reported in Table 3. 





Table 7 Determinants of land improving investments 
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  (0.795)  (0.844)  (0.754)  (1.185)  (0.718) 
Horticultural expansion
c  1.972**  -2.605**  -3.286***  -1.143  -0.147 
  (0.821)  (1.070)  (1.199)  (1.128)  (0.638) 
Coffee expansion
c  1.553*  1.733  -2.235***  0.771  0.051 
  (0.865)  (1.167)  (0.819)  (0.829)  (0.712) 
Forestry specialization
c  2.760*  -0.079  -0.433  3.017  -0.553 
  (1.462)  (1.183)  (1.296)  (1.833)  (1.596) 
Non-farm employment
c  -0.171  -1.044  -1.970**  -0.776  -0.887 
  (0.768)  (0.808)  (0.910)  (1.098)  (0.579) 
 











*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
 
a Coefficient and standard errors corrected for sampling weights, stratification, and finite population. 
b Predicted number of organizations, based on results of regressions reported in Table 3. 





6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
With regard to the determinants of local organizational development in central 
Honduras, the main findings of this study are that population growth contributes to 
organizational development at low levels of growth but has a diminishing and possibly 
negative effect at high growth rates, that proximity to the urban center reduces local 
organizational presence, and that the presence of immigrants appears to favor local 
organizational development.  Local organizational development related to NRM is 
positively associated with larger population levels but negatively with population density 
(land scarcity), and positively associated with education levels and expansion of coffee 
production. 
With regard to the impacts of local organizations on NRM, we find mixed results. 
Local organizations involved in NRM contribute to collective investment in NRM and 
assist in regulating use of common property resources and dealing with externalities (the 
patronatos are particularly important for establishing and enforcing these regulations), 
though these roles vary substantially across the development pathways.  Local 
organizations have mixed impacts on farmers= private decisions to adopt resource 
conservation measures; in some cases being associated with less adoption of such 
measures, such as no-burn practices and plowing in crop residues.  This may be because 
such conservation measures are of lower priority to many farmers than activities that 
generate greater income in the near term and which may substitute for conservation 





In contrast to the impacts of local organizations, we find that external government 
organizations seem to displace collective investment in NRM, though they promote other 
kinds of collective investment such as construction and maintenance of water systems 
and roads.  External organizations have a stronger impact on promoting adoption of some 
labor-intensive conservation measures (such as no-burn, plowing in crop residues, and 
terracing) on private cropland.  Some government organizations also play an important 
role in enforcing regulations or managing externalities, including the municipios in 
general and national level organizations in forestry communities (in combination with 
local organizations).  NGOs are also important in promoting some conservation practices, 
such as plowing in crop residues and use of live barriers. 
In a broad sense, the findings support the theory of induced organizational 
development, particularly the positive impact of population level and coffee production 
on local organizational presence.  However, they also suggest that land scarcity and very 
rapid population growth may undermine the ability for organizational development to 
keep pace with population, or the ability to achieve collective action for NRM.
28  In many 
communities (most notably rapidly developing horticultural expansion communities), 
local organizational development is still very limited, despite (or perhaps because of) 
very rapid population growth, improvements in road and market access, and increases in 
demand for credit and other services.  This suggests that local organizational 
development may be unable to respond to very rapid change.  
                                                 
28 Negative impacts of a rapid population growth rate (as opposed to a high 
population level) on NRM due to lags in institutional adjustment have been hypothesized 






The positive association between external and local organizational presence 
suggests that external organizations are playing a catalytic or complementary role in 
many cases, though the effort still may be insufficient to fulfill the demand where the 
pace of change is very rapid.  On the other hand, the negative impact of external 
organizations on collective investments in NRM suggests that caution is warranted when 
such organizations do intervene in local communities, to be sure that they are facilitating 
and not undermining local initiative.  External organizations appear to be essential to 
promote soil conservation measures on private farmland. 
Both external organizations and local organizations can play important and 
complementary roles in fostering more sustainable and productive use of natural 
resources.  The challenge for policy makers and program managers is to identify and 
exploit cases where synergies exist between external and local organizational 
development (such as providing complementary inputs into infrastructure development or 
in regulating resource use and externalities), to be cautious about intervening in a way 
that displaces local initiative (such as displacing local collective investments), and to 
focus effort on activities that have significant social benefits but are not being addressed 
adequately by private action (such as many conservation measures).  Given the 
possibilities of unexploited complementarities or unintended competition between the 
actions of external organizations and local organizations, increased investment by 
external actors in understanding the extent and roles of local organizations could yield 
substantial benefits. 
It is important to recognize that the opportunities for and constraints upon efforts 





economic opportunities, population pressure, and other factors.  This study focuses on a 
situation of relatively low level of economic development and low population density.   
One might expect to find similar results in similar conditions elsewhere, while in more 
developed or densely populated conditions substantially different relationships between 
organizational development and natural resource management may exist.  As our 
conceptual discussion emphasized, most determinant factors have theoretically 
ambiguous impacts, which can only be determined through careful empirical research.  
Such research on organizational development is still relatively limited.  It is hoped that 
this paper will encourage further efforts to disentangle the causes and effects of local 
organizational development in different circumstances, and help policy makers to 
consider such issues when considering how to target their efforts to promote more 







Summary statistics of variables used in the regressions 
 
Variable  Number of  
Observations 
Mean
a  Robust Standard 
Error
a 
Minimum  Maximum 
 
Number of local organizations  40  7.10  2.77  2  15 
           
Number of local organizations involved in NRM  40  2.60  2.34  0  9 
           
Number of government organizations  45  4.22  3.08  0  13 
           
Number of government organizations involved in 
NRM 
45  2.73  1.75  0  6 
           
Number of external NGOs  40  2.25  2.02  0  9 
           
Number of external NGOs involved in NRM   40  1.77  1.72  0  8 
           
Whether collective investment to control runoff or 
improve common land occurred 
47  0.30  0.46  0  1 
           
Index of proportion of households using
b:         
           
 Continuous cultivation  45  3.84  1.58  0  6 
           
 Burning to prepare fields  46  2.87  1.53  0  6 
           
 Irrigation  46  0.70  0.96  0  4 
           
 Fertilizer  48  2.50  1.75  0  6 





Variable  Number of  
Observations 
Mean
a  Robust Standard 
Error
a 
Minimum  Maximum 
 
 Insecticide  47  2.96  1.76  0  6 
           
 Herbicide  47  2.72  1.72  0  6 
           
 Improved seeds  48  1.33  1.98  0  6 
           
 Contour planting  47  1.55  1.73  0  5 
           
 Green manure  48  0.48  0.74  0  2 
           
 Minimum tillage  48  0.92  1.37  0  4 
           
 Mulching  48  1.40  1.77  0  5 
           
 Plowing in crop residues  46  1.37  1.74  0  5 
           
 Cow manure  48  0.94  1.21  0  4 
           
 Chicken manure  45  0.82  1.27  0  4 
           
 Terraces  48  1.29  1.50  0  4 
           
 Live barriers  48  1.85  1.57  0  6 
           
 Stone walls  48  2.02  1.68  0  6 
           
 Drainage ditches  47  1.09  1.28  0  4 
           
 Tree planting  48  1.69  1.64  0  5 
           
Village population—1974  47  652          422  46  1903 





Variable  Number of  
Observations 
Mean
a  Robust Standard 
Error
a 





47  37.5  33.4  4.0  170.2 
           
Population density—1988  47  46.9  43.5  5.0  223.0 
           
Annual population growth rate, 
1974-88 
47  1.97  2.72  -2.68  14.81 
           
Distance to urban market (km)  48  67.7  31.9  5  160 
           
Distance to nearest road (km)  48  1.6  3.5  0  16 
           
Percentage of literate adults, 1974  47  51.0  16.3  18.9  81.7 
           
Percentage of literate adults, 1988  48  56.1  21.0  13.1  90.0 
           
Percentage of 1974 population born in municipality  47  90.4  9.2  57.0  99.8 
           
Basic grain expansion pathway  48  0.10  0.31  0  1 
           
Basic grain stagnation pathway  48  0.31  0.47  0  1 
           
Horticultural expansion pathway  48  0.10  0.31  0  1 
           
Coffee expansion pathway  48  0.21  0.41  0  1 
           
Forestry specialization pathway  48  0.06  0.24  0  1 
           
Nonfarm employment pathway  48  0.21  0.41  0  1 
a Means and standard errors corrected for sampling weights, stratification, and finite population. 
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